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As hospitality and tourism (H&T) businesses mature, they often seek institutional equity 
financing to support their growth. Capital intensive H&T firms, such as cruise operators, casinos 
and large restaurant and hotel chains, continuously rely on institutional capital to fund their 
operations. This study examines which corporate social responsibility dimensions affect H&T 
firms’ ability to attract institutional equity capital providers. We document that firms with better 
social and governance performance have higher institutional ownership, particularly by investors 
focused on long-term growth and value creation, such as dedicated institutional investors, 
domestic investors and blockholders. Community and environmental performance do not 
increase institutional holdings.  





Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a “concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission, 2001, p. 3). This study examines 
whether CSR affects hospitality and tourism (H&T) firms’ ability to attract and maintain the 
desired level of institutional capital to support and grow their operations and which CSR 
dimensions play key roles in driving this relation. These questions are important for three 
reasons. First, as H&T businesses mature and expand, their ability to attract external equity is 
essential to support growth as the owners’ resources are limited. Thus, H&T owners and 
managers need to know whether their CSR activities will influence their ability to attract and 
maintain the required levels of external equity capital. Institutional equity funding is important as 
(1) H&T businesses often struggle to secure bank lending or face steep borrowing costs and (2) 
the capital requirements to expand and grow H&T businesses typically exceed the resources of 
the founders.1  
Second, several H&T sectors, such as casinos, cruise operators and restaurant and hotel 
chains, are capital intensive and require substantial ongoing investments in infrastructure and 
services. Therefore, these businesses need to (1) frequently seek external equity capital and (2) 
maintain high levels of institutional funding. For example, the capital spending of Royal 
Caribbean Cruises was $3.6 billion in 2018, two times the reported income of $1.8 billion. The 
media routinely mention new stock issuances by companies such as Burger King Holdings, 
Bloomin’ Brands, Cinemark Holdings, Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Host Hotels & Resorts, 
 
1 Cyclicality and high cashflow volatility in the H&T industry reduce the availability of bank lending and increase 
lending costs. Motta (2017) highlights that “due to information asymmetries, access to capital is a major obstacle for 
[service and hospitality] SMEs to expand their activities”. 
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MGM Resorts International, Starbucks and Wynn Resorts, which these firms use to finance their 
operations (Feng and Tseng, 2019).2 Thus, the ability to continually attract institutional investors 
is essential for the survival and growth of large, capital intensive H&T businesses. High capital 
requirements mean that H&T firms are particularly sensitive to reductions in an already high 
level of institutional holdings and capital outflows can severely impair operations, potentially 
leading to bankruptcies.3 High funding requirements in the H&T industry were laid bare during 
the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), as businesses had to continue covering high overheads 
(e.g. rent and maintenance of restaurants, hotels and cruise ships) when they were not earning 
any revenue to cover those costs. Thus, whether CSR can promote more institutional funding, 
particularly from long-term investors willing to support businesses over long periods of time, is 
an important question for managers in the H&T industry.  
Third, we focus on institutional investors as they are the main equity capital providers in the 
market. For example, the 2017 Pensions and Investments report highlights that “[I]nstitutions 
own about 78% of the market value of the U.S. broad-market Russell 3000 index, and 80% of the 
large-cap S&P [Standard and Poor’s] 500 index”. Thus, when searching for external equity 
financing, H&T businesses typically seek financing from institutional investors. Understanding 
the CSR preferences of the latter can affect H&T firms’ ability to attract these investors. Further, 
an increasing proportion of investment funds considers CSR to be a criterion for their 
investments. Stevens (2019) estimates that investment funds explicitly accounting for firms’ 
CSR performance grew to $30 trillion in 2018 and could reach $50 trillion over the next two 
 
2 The Thomson Reuters Eikon database shows that between 2000 and 2018, Caesars Entertainment and Caesars 
Acquisitions, an operator of casinos and resorts, issued new stock 33 times, Amergent Hospitality Group, a 
restaurant operator, issued equity 39 times and Hilton Group 39 times. 
3 The bankruptcy of the major U.K. travel group, Thomas Cook, was ultimately due to its inability to secure 




decades. Thus, as investors increasingly prioritise CSR among the factors influencing their 
capital allocation decisions, it is important for H&T firms’ managers to understand which CSR 
dimensions matter.  
To explain why institutional investors would consider firms’ CSR performance in their 
investment decisions, we build on two literature streams. First, we build on the agency theory 
and propose that CSR aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests, which in turn reduces the 
likelihood of managers misappropriating corporate funds (Kim, Rhou, Uysal and Kwon, 2017). 
CSR commits firms to corporate behaviour that respects employees, the environment and the 
community in which they operate (Dare, 2016). Although there is no agreed-on set of rules or 
actions that a firm should take to be considered as meeting its CSR, investors and CSR rating 
agencies agree that a firm’s attitude towards its employees, environment, customers, community 
and corporate governance capture the key CSR dimensions.4 A firm violating CSR norms, for 
example by repressing trade unions or damaging the environment, sends a signal that it is either 
unable or unwilling to meet its commitments. Investors can interpret this as a sign of poor 
managerial dedication to meet the goals of the firm’s stakeholders, including its shareholders 
(Flammer, 2012). We expect that institutional investors will be unwilling to commit funds to 
companies with a poor track record of meeting their CSR promises.  
Second, we build on the corporate reputation theory and studies documenting the important 
role that CSR plays in building and maintaining corporate image (Fombrun, 2005; Walsh and 
Beatty, 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2011; Famiyeh et al., 2016; Nazir and Islam, 2020; Kim, 
Milliman and Lucas, 2021; Koseoglu, Uyar, Kilic, Kuzey and Karaman, 2021; Ou, Wong and 
 
4 The key CSR scoring institutions, such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, the Global Reporting 
Initiative and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, all consider these four dimensions when 
assessing firms’ CSR performance. 
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Huang, 2021).5 RepTrak Company (2020) survey evidence suggests that CSR-related factors 
account for up to 41% of corporate reputation. Violating CSR commitments can lead to a 
reputational loss that can negatively affect a firm’s ability to attract external capital.  
This study examines which CSR dimensions affect H&T firms’ ability to attract institutional 
equity capital providers. To date, the H&T literature has not addressed this research question, 
leaving a gap in the literature. Further, non-H&T literature provides mixed evidence on the 
association between a firm’s CSR performance and institutional ownership.6 To answer the 
research question, we collect information on institutional holdings in H&T companies listed in 
the United States (U.S.) over the period 2010–2018. We focus on the H&T industry because of 
its prominence in the broader service industry in terms of employment and its significant 
contribution to gross domestic product (GDP): The World Travel and Tourism Council suggest a 
contribution of $8.8 trillion to the global economy in 2018, representing 10.4% of the world’s 
total GDP, with 319 million people employed in the H&T industry worldwide.7 We purposefully 
use a recent sample period as CSR’s capital market impact can change over time and we want 
our result to be timely.8  
 
5 Several studies have examined the adoption and impact of CSR in the H&T industry. The general conclusion from 
these studies is that CSR affects customer loyalty, legitimacy in the local community, employee attitudes and 
company performance. Coles, Fenclova and Dinan (2013), Font and Lynes (2018), Iyer and Jarvis (2019) and 
Moyeen, Kamal and Yousuf (2019) provide excellent reviews of CSR in the H&T industry.  
6 Teoh and Shiu (1990) find no evidence that institutional investors consider CSR when choosing firms to invest in 
from a sample of all firms listed on the U.S. exchanges. Coffey and Fryxell (1991) report that institutional investors 
have lower holdings in more socially conscious firms in South Africa. Graves and Waddock (1994) document no 
association between the percentage of institutional ownership and CSR for a large cross-section of listed firms. 
Fernando et al. (2010) find that both green firms and toxic firms have lower institutional holdings than neutral firms. 
Chava (2014) documents a negative relation between institutional ownership and firms’ environmental concerns. 
Gillan et al. (2012) find that institutions hold fewer shares in firms that improve their social and environmental 
scores. In contrast, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) report higher ownership by dedicated institutions in firms with better CSR 
performance. 
7 See https://hospitalityinsights.ehl.edu/hospitality-industry. 
8 For example, Bloomberg highlights that the prominence of CSR in the media is associated with the increase in 





To capture CSR activity, we follow previous research, including Byrd, Bosley and 
Dronberger (2009), McGehee, Wattanakamolchai, Perdue and Calvert (2009), Inoue and Lee 
(2011), and Feng and Tseng (2019), and identify four key CSR dimensions. The social 
dimension captures a firm’s relation with its employees, respect for the diversity of the corporate 
workforce and for human rights and citizenship within its local community. Environmental 
performance captures a firm’s support for the environment. Corporate governance performance 
measures the quality of a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms, such as its board structure, 
board independence and business ethics. Finally, product and service performance examines how 
firms respond to customer needs by providing quality, safe and innovative products and services.  
Our main findings are as follows. We document that firms with better social and governance 
performance have higher institutional ownership. Community and environmental concerns do 
not increase institutional holdings. These results are consistent with those of Fernando, Sharfman 
and Uysal (2010), which show that the worst environmental performers have higher portfolio 
returns, which can motivate institutional investors to hold these stocks. Our conclusions are 
unchanged when we subject our results to robustness tests that include alternative estimation 
methods, controlling for unobservable firm characteristics, such as the performance of the 
managerial team, addressing endogeneity and reverse causality concerns.  
We recognise that not all types of institutional investors may be desirable for H&T 
businesses. In particular, transient institutional investors hold stock to maximise short-term 
returns from stock trades, often at the expense of firms’ long-term value creation (Bushee, 2001). 
Such investors may not be desirable for H&T businesses focused on sustainable and long-term 
value creation. We document that better social and governance performance can attract dedicated 
investors that focus on long-term value creation, domestic investors, which are less likely to 
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withdraw capital during market shocks, and blockholders, which tend to engage with managers 
to create long-term value (Edmans, 2014). Thus, the social and governance dimensions of CSR 
help attract investors more attuned to sustainable value creation in the H&T industry. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and 
develops the research hypotheses. We present the data and research methods in Section 3. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results and the discussion and conclusions follow in Section 5.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. CSR in the H&T industry 
Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) organisation legitimacy theory highlights that CSR legitimises a 
firm in the eyes of customers, employees and local communities as the firm commits to respect 
and adhere to commonly accepted social values. Gray et al. (2010, p. 28) highlight that 
“organisations can only continue to exist if the society in which they are based perceives the 
organisation to be operating to a value system that is commensurate with the society's own value 
system”. Deegan (2009) stresses that companies need to continuously assure stakeholders that 
they are functioning within the legal and social bonds and norms. Deegan and Samkin (2009) 
emphasise that companies do not operate in isolation but through establishing “social contracts” 
with various stakeholders, such as employees, communities, regulators and shareholders. CSR 
helps to legitimise the social contract between a firm and the societies with which it interacts.  
The need for legitimacy can explain the link between CSR activities in the H&T industry and 
employee engagement (Gürlek and Tuna, 2019), business reputation (Fu, Ye and Law, 2014) and 
customer loyalty (Vassilikopoulou, Siomkos and Mylonakis, 2005). The emerging hospitality 
economics literature has also explored the link between CSR and financial performance (Lee and 
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Park, 2009; Kang, Lee and Huh, 2010, 2015; Theodoulidis, Diaz, Crotto and Rancati, 2017; 
Ringham and Miles, 2018) and firm value (Lee, Singal and Kang, 2013). Feng, Wang and Huang 
(2014) report that tourism firms in Western countries with active CSR programmes have a lower 
cost of equity. Watts and Holme (1999) highlight that CSR reflects a business’s commitment to 
contribute to economic development through improving the quality of life of its workforce, local 
community and greater society. H&T firms devote significant resources to CSR activities. This 
reflects the increased attention to the sustainability of the H&T business model, which has been 
criticised for significant externalities, such as negative effects on employees and on the 
environments and communities in which the businesses operate. To illustrate, Cohen, Higham, 
Peeters and Gossling (2014) highlight that by 2050, tourism will likely generate 40% of global 
carbon emissions. However, the literature has not yet examined how an H&T firm’s CSR 
activities affect its ability to attract institutional funding, which is the focus of this study.  
 
2.2. Institutional investors and firms’ CSR activities 
Institutional investors, such as insurance companies, pension and mutual funds, held between 
78% and 80% of the total market value of stocks listed in the U.S. in 2017, compared to 34% in 
1980 (The 2017 Pensions and Investments Report). Previous research documents a positive 
association between institutional ownership and firm value (Duggal and Millar, 1999; Woidtke, 
2002). Institutional investors promote value creation by improving firms’ corporate governance, 
which includes changing executive compensation, removing underperforming managers and 
promoting performance though proxy proposals (Smith, 1996; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 
1996; Wahal, 1996; Carleton, Neslon and Weisbach, 1998). Dedicated institutional investors also 
allow managers to focus on long-term projects and value creation by promoting spending on 
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innovation and investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and 
Prantl, 2009). In contrast to institutional investors, retail investors have limited capital and invest 
for short-term profit maximisation (Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2000, 2008; Barber, Lee, 
Liu and Odean, 2009).  
We expect that firms’ CSR activities will affect institutional investors’ choice of firms in 
which to invest. Institutional investors use a variety of signals to assess a firm’s investment risk 
and gauge the commitment of a firm’s managerial team to creating value. When deciding on 
their investments, institutional investors conduct detailed analyses of firms’ financial 
performance, follow analyst recommendations and participate in conference calls with managers 
(Davis and Steil, 2004). CSR sends a valuable signal concerning (1) the firm’s commitment to 
ethical and conscientious behaviour, and thus its ability and commitment to meet various 
stakeholders’ demands and expectations of the firm; and (2) the firm’s ability to mitigate 
“legitimisation risk” (Lindblom, 1994). Consistent with the signalling effect, Aggarwal, Hu and 
Yang (2015) document that institutional investors reduce holdings in companies subjected to 
regulatory interventions related to accounting misstatements, which they interpret as a 
managerial lack of commitment to truthful disclosure. Legitimisation risk reflects the negative 
consequences of unexpected events, such as financial or environmental scandals. Firms’ CSR 
activities can build reputational capital that helps mitigate the negative consequences of such 
events. Consistent with this, Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2017, 1785) report that “firms with high 
social capital, as measured by corporate social responsibility intensity, had stock returns that 
were four to seven percentage points higher than firms with low social capital during the 2008–
2009 financial crisis”. The authors state that the “evidence suggests that the trust between a firm 
and both its stakeholders and investors, built through investments in social capital, pays off when 
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the overall level of trust in corporations and markets suffers a negative shock”. Thus, we expect 
that institutional investors will consider a firm’s CSR performance when deciding whether to 
invest in it and will hold more shares in companies with better CSR performance. Therefore, our 
first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Better CSR performance is positively associated with institutional ownership.  
The literature recognises that different agendas and holding periods promote different types of 
institutional behaviour (Del Guercio, 1996; Woidtke, 2002). Transient investors have short 
investment horizons and favour short-term stock price gains over long-term value creation. 
Research shows that these investors often pressure managers to abandon long-term projects and 
investment in research and development (R&D) to maximise firms’ short-term income (Bushee, 
1998, 2001; Edmans, 2007; Cherkes, Sagi and Stanton, 2009). Bushee (2001) documents that 
firms with a higher proportion of short-term institutional investors are associated with lower 
long-term value.  
In contrast, dedicated institutional investors—investors that have long investment horizons 
and turn their portfolios over less frequently—are willing to learn about firms and are more 
likely to promote long-term sustainable value creation (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007). CSR 
legitimises a firm within its operating environment, promoting long-term value creation (Lee, 
Singal and Kang, 2013). Long-term value creation aligns with the investment horizon of 
dedicated investors. Therefore, we expect that dedicated investors will increase their holdings in 
firms with better CSR performance. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: Better CSR performance is associated with higher holdings by dedicated investors. 
Blockholders hold economically large positions in firms, thus their wealth is more sensitive to 
the stock price performance of individual firms in their portfolios compared to highly diversified 
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investors holding relatively small stakes in individual firms in their portfolios (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Gorton and Schmid 2000). Aoki (1984) highlights that because blockholders 
invest significant capital into individual firms, they perform more in-depth scrutiny and analysis 
of the firm. We expect that blockholders will consider a firm’s CSR performance as an indicator 
of potential risk, e.g., the likelihood of a future regulatory action if a firm violates labour or 
environment regulation (Starks, 2009), and a signal of a firm’s commitment to long-term value 
creation (Kim, Kim, Kim, and Park, 2019). Highly diversified institutional investors have less 
incentive to spend resources on costly firm analysis and monitoring as even a large negative 
stock price shock to an individual firm will have a small effect on their overall portfolio 
performance. Consistently, Clark and Hebb (2005) highlight that investors with higher portfolio 
sensitivity to an individual stock’s price volatility consider the firm’s reputation, such as in terms 
of corporate governance quality and employee protection, when selecting firms to invest in. Lins, 
Servaes, and Tamayo (2017) report that firms with high CSR scores performed better than firms 
with low CSR scores during the 2008–2009 financial crisis as measured by the stock price 
performance. To safeguard their investments, blockholders often establish private 
communication channels with managers, actively monitor managerial performance and pressure 
managers to improve firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Blockholders are also more 
interested in long-term value creation as they tend to hold stock for longer. In line with this, 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) report a positive relation between firm value and 
concentrated ownership by the largest shareholders. Based on the above discussion, we expect 
that blockholders will increase their holdings in companies with better CSR performance, which 
leads to our third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Better CSR performance is associated with higher ownership by blockholders. 
12 
 
3. Data and research methods 
The data on H&T companies listed in the U.S. between 2010 and 2018 were collected from the 
Compustat database. We start in 2010 to prevent the 2007–2009 financial crisis from affecting 
our analysis. Ending in 2018 ensures a gap between the end of the sample period and the 
COVID-19 pandemic.9 We use Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 13F data to calculate 
quarterly institutional holdings. Institutional investment managers who exercise investment 
discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities are required to report their 
quarterly holdings on Form 13F to the Securities and Exchange Commission within 45 days of 
each quarter’s end. Compustat Quarterly is the source of the quarterly financial data required to 
calculate the control variables. The sample is 2,064 firm-quarter-years with non-missing 
information. 
Following Uyar, Karamahmutoglu, Köseoglu and Karaman (2020), we classify H&T firms 
into four sectors based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes: 
travel, hotels and recreation, casinos and restaurants. Appendix A details the industry codes that 
we used to classify firms into the four sectors. Table 1 reports the number of observations in the 
four sectors calculated at an annual frequency. We have a total of 990 firm-years in the 
restaurant sector, 114 firm-years in the casino sector, 544 in hotels and recreation and 416 in the 
travel sector.  
[Table 1 around here] 
3.1. Measures of CSR 
Following Clarkson (1995), Inoue and Lee (2011) and Feng and Tseng (2019), we use the 
 
9 Companies reported financial results and CSR performance for the fiscal year 2019 starting from March 2020. If 
we included 2019 in the sample period, this would add noise to the analysis of the relation between CSR and 
institutional ownership.  
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Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) data, which reflect corporate attention to key issues of 
interest to stakeholders to capture firms’ CSR performance. The data are collected by MSCI, an 
investment research company which evaluates U.S. firms that are part of the S&P 500 and 
Russell 3000 indexes in terms of their social, environmental, governance and product 
performance. MSCI collects CSR information from various sources, including the media, non-
governmental organisations, governments, public documents and annual reports. Inoue and Lee 
(2011, p. 795) highlight that the “KLD database is considered the most comprehensive 
multidimensional CSR measures available to the public”. 
There are several benefits of using KLD. First, the scores are company-specific and are based 
on a company’s interactions with its stakeholders. This allows us to directly measure a firm’s 
performance in relation to its primary stakeholders as defined by Clarkson (1995).10 Second, by 
looking at each dimension independently, we avoid using a firm’s aggregate CSR score. This 
allows us to understand which dimensions institutional investors care about. For example, 
Berman, Wicks, Kotha and Jones (1999) document that among the KLD dimensions, only 
employee relations show a positive association with a firm’s profitability. Third, the KLD 
dimensions have been firmly established in the tourism literature. Several studies have used the 
data, including those of Byrd, Bosley and Dronberger (2009), McGehee, Wattanakamolchai, 
Perdue and Calvert (2009), Inoue and Lee (2011) and Feng and Tseng (2019), which builds 
confidence in the validity of the measures.  
The KLD database identifies four key CSR dimensions. The social dimension captures four 
groups. The employee relations score is based on a company’s performance in ensuring 
 
10 Clarkson (1995, p. 106) identifies primary stakeholders as individuals, groups and institutions “without whose 
continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern”, such as shareholders, employees, 
customers and public stakeholders, such as the community and the natural environment. 
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employees’ health and safety, providing retirement benefits and maintaining favourable union 
relations. The diversity score measures how a firm integrates diversity into its management and 
operations, for example through the appointment of women and minority executives. The human 
rights variables score a firm on the initiatives that benefit human rights, including indigenous 
peoples’ relations, labour and human rights policies. The community score is based on whether 
a company supports communities through education, charity and volunteer programmes. 
 The second CSR dimension is environmental performance, which is concerned with a firm’s 
support for the environment. This includes the use of clean energy and the provision of 
environmentally friendly products and services. The third dimension is corporate governance, 
which measures the quality of a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms, such as its board 
structure, board independence and business ethics. The fourth dimension is product and service 
performance, which scores whether a firm responds to customer needs by providing quality, safe 
and innovative products and services.  
We follow previous studies (e.g. Turban and Greening, 1996) in measuring firms’ CSR scores 
in the four areas—social, environmental, corporate governance and product and service—by 
subtracting the total number of concerns from the total number of strengths. This generates a net 
score for each area. Appendix B lists definitions of the strengths and concerns in each dimension. 
A firm can receive a score ranging from 0 (no strength) to 2 (strong strength) in a strength area 
and a score ranging from 0 (no concern) to 2 (strong concern) for concerns. We then use the 
composite scores in the analysis.11 In robustness tests, we show that our results are the same 
when we create ratios of (1 + strengths)/(1 + strengths + concerns). KLD scores are measured 
 
11 We create the net scores ourselves as the KLD database discontinued reporting total scores for strengths and 
concerns in 2013. However, in robustness tests, we also use the KLD total scores to create the net measures for the 
period 2010–2013 and find similar results.  
15 
 
annually over the sample period.  
Table 2 presents the relative rankings for the KLD measures across the four sectors. 
Specifically, we calculate the mean KLD for each sector in the sample and then rank the sectors 
on each CSR dimension from best to worst performance. The travel sector has the highest 
relative ranking for employee, diversity, community and environment performance. This result is 
consistent with the heavy criticism the sector received for its employee and environmental 
impact, which resulted in substantial CSR investment in these areas (Gössling, 2002). The casino 
sector tends to have the worst scores across most dimensions.  
[Table 2 around here] 
3.2. Measures of institutional ownership 
We measure institutional ownership, Institutional Ownership, as the sum of the holdings of all 
institutions in a firm’s stock divided by the stock’s total market capitalisation at the end of each 
calendar quarter. To sharpen the analysis, we also disaggregate institutional ownership into 
shareholding by domestic investors, Domestic IO, which is the sum of the holdings of all 
institutions domiciled in the U.S. divided by the firm’s market capitalisation.12 Because 
institutional investors differ in their investment strategies and holding periods, we also separate 
holdings by investment style, using the classification from Bushee (2001). Specifically, 
Dedicated IO sums up the percentage of holdings by dedicated institutions, which provide stable 
ownership and take large shares in individual firms, and holdings by quasi-indexers, which trade 
infrequently and own small stakes, similar to an index strategy. Bushee (2001) documents that 
holdings by quasi and dedicated investors are associated with higher firm performance. Finally, 
we calculate holdings by blockholders, defined as investors who hold at least 5% of a company’s 
 
12 We use the abbreviation IO to denote institutional ownership.  
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stock. We then measure the percentage of holdings by the top five blockholders, Top 5 IO. We 
measure institutional holdings for firm i at the end of each fiscal quarter q for year t.  
The regression model we use has the form: 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑞+1,𝑡
= 𝜃0 +  𝜃1𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑞,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑞,𝑡
+ 𝜃3𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑞,𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑞,𝑡
+ 𝜃5𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑞,𝑡 + 𝜃6𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑞,𝑡
+ 𝜃7𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑞,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑞,𝑡, 
(1) 
where the dependent variable is either Institutional Ownership, Dedicated IO or Top 5 IO. 
The controls include variables that previous studies associate with institutional ownership, 
such as firm size, measured as a firm’s market capitalisation, MV, as institutional investors tend 
to invest in larger firms (Edison and Warnock, 2003) and larger firms tend to have more liquid 
stock that facilitates institutional trade (Cooper, Growth and Avera, 1985). We control for firm 
profitability, measured by return on assets, ROA, as institutional investors may be attracted to 
more profitable firms (Gompers, Ishi and Metrick, 2001) and low profitability is associated with 
higher stock risk (Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015). We include the price-to-sales ratio, P/S, the book-
to-market ratio, B/M, and the R&D spending scaled by sales, R&D, to capture a firm’s risk and 
growth opportunities as institutional investors prefer growth firms (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006). 
Several studies show that firms with high B/M ratios and low investment rates are associated 
with higher risk (Fama and French, 1992; Bolton, Chen and Wang, 2011). We capture firms’ 
visibility using their advertising spending scaled by sales, Advertising, as institutional investors 
may be attracted to firms that are more visible in the market (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003). 
Finally, we control for firms’ financial leverage, Leverage, as debt financing can act as a 
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substitute for equity financing (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Control variables are measured at the 
end of the fiscal quarter prior to the quarter where we measure institutional holdings to reduce 
the likelihood of reverse causality. We estimate the model using OLS with standard errors 
adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study and correlations 
between the CSR dimensions. Panel A documents the results for the dependent variables. The 
average institutional ownership is around 81.2%, which suggests that institutional investors are 
the most important shareholders in H&T listed firms. Dedicated investors hold around 71.3% of 
equity, and domestic investors hold 75.5% of stock. The ownership of top five blockholders is 
around 32.9%. These results suggest that institutional investors focused on long-term value 
creation are the main shareholders in the H&T industry. Appendix D reports institutional 
ownership for each sector and we find comparable levels. This result suggests that institutional 
ownership is likely important for each H&T sector. Panel B documents the KLD measures and 
the results are consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Inoue and Lee, 2011). Panel C reports the 
descriptive statistics for the control variables, which are comparable with earlier studies (e.g. Lee 
and Park, 2009; Kang, Lee and Huh, 2010, 2015; Lee, Singal and Kang, 2013; Theodoulidis, 
Diaz, Crotto and Rancati, 2017; Ringham and Miles, 2018). Panel D shows the correlations 
between the KLD measures. Most correlations are significant and the magnitudes are below 0.8, 
which is typically considered an indicator of a potential multicollinearity problem (Franke, 
2010). Some of the correlations between measures are weak or negative because each CSR 
dimension captures a different area of corporate activity. For example, an emphasis on product 
quality and safety does not guarantee that a firm will spend resources on the professional 
development of employees or employee profit sharing. This justifies the need to look at 
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individual dimensions rather than one CSR index for a firm.  
[Table 3 around here] 
4. Regression results 
Table 4 reports the regression results for equation (1), where the dependent variable is the 
percentage of institutional ownership in a stock. The first columns present the results for the OLS 
model. The ‘fixed effects’ columns report the results for equation (1) with firm-fixed effects.13 
This model helps better control for unobserved firm effects, such as the quality of the managerial 
team, but at the cost of lower power to detect statistically significant relations if the variables, 
such as CSR scores, are “sticky”.  
We first focus on the OLS regression results in Table 4. None of the values for the variance 
inflation factors in column ‘VIF’ is higher than 10, a rule of thumb for potential 
multicollinearity. This result suggests that all CSR dimensions capture slightly different aspects 
of CSR, a conclusion similar to the Table 3 evidence of the correlations between the CSR 
dimensions. We find that companies with higher Net Employee and Net Diversity scores tend to 
have higher institutional ownership. Further, the Net Corporate Governance and Net Product and 
Service dimensions also have a positive effect on institutional holdings. Jointly, the results 
suggest that (1) how firms build relations with their employees and respect the diversity of their 
workforce; (2) the quality of internal corporate governance mechanisms which ensure that 
managers act in the interest of shareholders; and (3) the quality of firms’ products are the 
dimensions that institutional investors care about. The Net Human and Net Community 
dimensions have a negative effect on institutional ownership. It is plausible that investors 
perceive that local and federal governments are responsible for supporting the local community, 
 
13 The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the random effects model is preferred. 
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rather than private enterprises through corporate donations. Further, direct corporate involvement 
in social issues can expose a company to potential customer and legal backlash. For example, the 
Starbucks CEO’s challenge of policies promoted by former U.S. president Trump resulted in 
backlash from Trump supporters; #boycottStarbucks became a top trending hashtag on Twitter.14 
[Table 4 around here] 
To gauge the relative economic magnitude of the effects of each CSR dimension, we report 
standardised coefficients where all variables are standardised to a mean of zero and a unit 
standard deviation. These coefficients show how institutional ownership would change for the 
same magnitude of change in each independent variable.15 The ‘STD estimate’ column shows 
that Net Diversity has the largest economic effect on institutional ownership: A one standard 
deviation increase in Net Diversity would increase institutional ownership by 22.3% standard 
deviations, four times greater than the effect of Net Product and Service. The model’s adjusted 
R2 suggests that the variables jointly explain 16.7% of the quarterly variation in institutional 
ownership. In untabulated results, we find that estimating equation (1) without the CSR measures 
produces an adjusted R2 of 10.9%, which suggests that the CSR measures can improve the 
model’s explanatory power by 53%.  
The last columns of Table 4 report the results for regressions with firm-fixed effects. We find 
that the Net Employee, Net Diversity and Net Corporate Governance variables are positively 
associated with institutional holdings. Interestingly, controlling for firm-fixed effects shows that 




15 We use standardised coefficients because the usual unit-change interpretation of coefficients from an OLS 
regression ignores that a one-unit change for a variable can be associated with different economic magnitudes of 
changes. For example, Net Human Rights ranges between 0 and 1; thus, a one-unit increase in the Net Human 
Rights variable means a 100% increase in this score. In contrast, a one-unit increase in the Net Employee score is 
only a 20% change as its range lies between -1 and 3. 
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increases to 87.62%, which suggests that a substantial proportion of the variation in institutional 
holdings is firm-specific.  
Based on the results in Table 4, we conclude that a firm’s performance for the social 
dimension of CSR together with its corporate governance performance are positively associated 
with institutional holdings in the firm, a result consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
 
4.1. Further tests 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict that CSR will positively affect a firm’s ability to attract more 
dedicated investors and blockholders. To test these predictions, Table 5 reports regression results 
where we use as the dependent variable the percentage of ownership by dedicated institutional 
investors, Dedicated IO, domestic institutional investors, Domestic IO, and top five institutional 
investors, Top 5 IO. The conclusions from these tests mirror our main results: Firms with better 
social and governance performance have higher dedicated institutional investor, domestic 
institutional investor and blockholding ownership. Further, we find that better performance for 
product and service quality can attract more domestic investors and more blockholders. Net 
Human Rights and Net Community performance show a negative association with the three 
institutional ownership measures, which suggests that company performance in these dimensions 
does not positively affect these investors’ investment decisions.  
[Table 5 around here] 
4.2. Robustness tests 
In sensitivity tests, we perform three analyses to build confidence in our conclusions. First, we 
recalculate each KLD score as a ratio of (1 + strengths)/(1 + strengths + concerns). We perform 
this test because of concerns that netting strengths and weaknesses may not capture the 
21 
 
variability in CSR across firms. For example, a firm with three strengths and three concerns has 
the same score as a firm with a score of zero for both strengths and concerns. However, the two 
firms would have scores of 0.57 vs. 1, respectively, in the recalculated measure. The smaller 
value captures a larger variation in CSR dimensions, which reflects higher uncertainty about a 
firm’s future CSR scores. The ‘IO (recalculated KLD)’ column in Table 6 reports results when 
we use the CSR ratios. We find similar conclusions to our main results. Further, in untabulated 
results, we also calculate the ratios as (1 + strengths)/(1+ concerns) and reach the same 
conclusions. Thus, our results are not sensitive to the way that we calculate the measures of 
firms’ CSR performance.  
[Table 6 around here] 
Because previous studies frequently use total strengths and total concerns as reported by KLD 
to capture CSR dimensions (e.g. Inoue and Lee, 2011), in the ‘IO (org KLD measures)’ column, 
we report equation (1) results with these original measures that were discontinued in 2013. Using 
the original measures produces results similar to our main conclusions. Thus, our conclusions are 
not driven by the way that we define the CSR measures.  
 
4.3. Endogeneity and reverse causality 
We recognise that firms decide whether to implement CSR measures; thus, our conclusions may 
reflect these endogenous decisions. We believe that our tests that use lead-lag relations in 
equation (1) jointly with firm-fixed effects significantly reduce the likelihood of endogeneity 
affecting our conclusions. This is also reflected in the Hausman test, which suggests no evidence 
of endogeneity. However, for extra robustness, we also use instrumental variables analysis to 
ensure that our conclusions are robust. As the instrument, we use the average CSR performance 
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of a company’s industry, captured by the NAICS code, excluding the focal firm. Industry CSR 
activities should not affect institutional ownership in a focal firm; however, we would expect 
industry CSR activities to correlate with a firm’s CSR decisions. Thus, the instrument meets both 
the exclusion and relevance criteria. The ‘instrumental variables’ column in Table 6 reports 
regression results for the 2SLS model and the conclusions are similar to our main results.  
To address the reverse causality issue, Appendix E reports the results from regressing each 
CSR dimension on (1) past institutional ownership and (2) the six CSR dimensions measured in 
the previous year. We control for past CSR scores because of significant persistence in the 
measures. This means that the regressions are effectively capturing the incremental effect of past 
institutional ownership on past CSR performance. We do not find that past institutional 
ownership affects a firm’s current CSR score, controlling for the firm’s past CSR performance. 
These results reduce the likelihood of reverse causality, although we acknowledge that we cannot 
rule out this alternative explanation. 
Our research design measures institutional ownership one quarter after we observe firm CSR 
scores to reduce the likelihood of the results being driven by reverse causality. To further reduce 
the likelihood that institutional ownership drives changes in CSR, we run a Granger-type lead-
lag test where we include lagged institutional holdings among the explanatory variables. Our 
conclusions from this test are identical to our main findings (result untabulated).  
Finally, we conduct a Google search for any indications of shareholder activism focused on 
the sample firms’ CSR activities. We do not find news or other sources suggesting proposals or 
pressure from shareholders to change firms’ CSR activities. We acknowledge that such pressures 
may be applied through private channels; however, we believe that investments funds would 
make such attempts public to showcase their proactive approach to firms’ CSR activities. The 
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fact that we find no evidence of such actions suggests that those private channels are unlikely to 
drive our results.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Ensuring that businesses have sufficient capital to support their existing operations, including 
enough to make ongoing investments in infrastructure, expand their operations and develop staff 
and new services for customers, is essential for the sound development of the H&T industry. The 
World Travel and Tourism Council estimates that the capital spending of the global travel and 
tourism industry amounted to $948 billion in 2019, supporting 330 million jobs (1 in 10 jobs 
around world). This study examines the relation between H&T firms’ CSR activities and 
institutional ownership, an important source of equity capital for these firms. We document that 
businesses with better social and governance performance have higher institutional ownership, 
particularly by dedicated institutional investors, domestic investors and blockholders, which are 
more focused on long-term value creation. To ensure the robustness of our conclusions, we 
subject the results to several sensitivity tests that include alternative estimation methods, 
controlling for unobservable firm characteristics and endogeneity. Our use of recent data ending 
in 2018 also helps build confidence that the results are timely and of relevance to H&T 
businesses.  
Interestingly, we find that community and environmental concerns do not increase 
institutional holdings. These results may capture appealing investment returns offered by some 
companies with poor track records of community and environment performance. Fabozzi, Ma 
and Oliphant (2008, p. 82) document that “sin stocks”—companies associated with activities that 
are perceived negatively in light of social norms (e.g. alcohol, tobacco, gambling and weapons 
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manufacturers)—“produced an annual return of 19% over the study period, unambiguously 
outperforming common benchmarks in terms of both magnitude and frequency”. Gray (2015) 
states that environmental regulations impose costs on manufacturing plants, resulting in lower 
productivity. Pham, Ramiah and Moosa (2020, p. 3280) highlight the possibility that the 
“adoption of costly environmental policies and practices by a firm may be perceived [by 
investors] to be an unnecessary burden that will have a negative effect on the firm’s financial 
indicators. According to this view, environmental regulation exerts a negative effect on the 
bottom line of the regulated firms, and hence the return on assets or shareholders’ equity, at least 
because regulation triggers extensive compliance costs.” Veith, Werner and Zimmermann (2009) 
find that European electricity manufacturers pass on costs arising from the increasing prices of 
emission allowances to consumers. Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) report that the returns of 
heavy Australian polluters were unaffected by environmental regulation as these firms passed on 
the costs to consumers, while the returns of low polluters, such as beverage firms, were affected 
by rising costs. Although our results suggest that firms’ community and environment related 
actions do not have a positive effect on institutional ownership, we recommend that managers 
take a holistic view and consider how poor performance in these dimensions reduces a firm’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of customers, employees and regulators.   
This paper has several theoretical and practical implications. First, we contribute to the 
growing CSR literature on the service industry (Vassilikopoulou, Siomkos and Mylonakis, 2005; 
Lee and Park, 2009; Kang, Lee and Huh, 2010; Lee, Singal and Kang, 2013; Feng, Wang and 
Huang, 2014; Fu, Ye and Law, 2014, 2015; Theodoulidis, Diaz, Crotto and Rancati, 2017; 
Ringham and Miles, 2018; Gürlek and Tuna, 2019) by identifying a positive relation between 
H&T firms’ CSR activities and ownership by institutional investors, particularly by investors 
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more interested in promoting companies’ long-term growth. The study enhances our 
understanding of how CSR affects an important group of external stakeholders—institutional 
investors—which complements previous research that examined the relation between CSR and 
another external stakeholder group: customers (Li, Fu and Huang, 2015; Boccia, Malgeri Manzo 
and Covino, 2019). 
Second, our findings provide empirical support for the multidimensional conceptualisation of 
CSR, where various dimensions play different roles for diverse audiences (Carroll, 1999). Our 
study identifies which dimensions influence institutional ownership and quantifies their 
respective importance. Further, our focus on the H&T industry responds to the call in Rhou and 
Singal’s (2020) research. These authors argue that hospitality research needs to explore the 
importance of CSR at the industry level to better understand the industry-specific relevance of 
CSR. 
Third, the study results are of direct relevance to H&T industry business owners seeking 
institutional capital; the results can guide their decisions on which CSR dimensions to promote. 
Critics of CSR highlight the substantial costs of implementing and managing CSR. A report from 
the Institute of Economic Affairs highlights that “far from being harmless, its [CSR] adoption 
threatens prosperity in poor countries as well as rich. It is likely to reduce competition and 
economic freedom and to undermine the market economy” (Henderson, 2001). We show that 
external equity capital providers consider CSR in their investment decisions. Better performance 
in the social and governance dimensions makes H&T companies more attractive to long-term 
institutional investors. The fact that not all CSR dimensions are relevant to institutional investors 




Fourth, we add to the broader literature on the links between CSR and institutional ownership. 
Previous research documents mixed evidence on the association between CSR performance and 
institutional holdings (Teoh and Shiu, 1990; Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 
1994; Fernando et al., 2010; Chava, 2014; Gillan et al., 2012; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). 
Finally, our evidence is also important for policymakers as large H&T businesses are 
frequently key employers in economically deprived areas. Therefore, their ability to access 
financing to maintain and grow their existing operations is important in policy setting.16 For 
example, David Henderson, the former Head of Economics and Statistics at the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, claims that the “corporate social responsibility 
movement will increase business costs, reduce welfare and undermine the market economy” and 
that “[t]he greatest potential for harm arises from government attempts to regulate the world as a 
whole in the name of CSR”.17 Our results suggest that despite regulators’ concerns that CSR may 
increase business costs, there are important externalities to policies promoting CSR, such as the 
ability to attract institutional funding. Capital flows into H&T firms in the private sector can 
reduce the need for government loans and funding, which can then be deployed in other areas, 
such as to reduce poverty, a concern for developing countries. Regulators could promote CSR 
activities focused on improving employee relations, diversity among workforce and the quality 
of corporate governance. This could include policies that promote stronger trade unions, 
employee health and safety and professional employee development. Governments could also 
promote campaigns raising awareness of the benefits of CSR activities, including by establishing 
recognition awards that increase the visibility of the best performing firms. Finally, governments 
 
16 The World Travel and Tourism Council’s 2019 global economic impact report highlights that the travel industry 
employed one in 10 people in the world and contributed 10.3% to global GDP: https://wttc.org/Research/Economic-
Impact. 
17 See https://iea.org.uk/in-the-media/press-release/corporate-social-responsibility-raises-costs-undermines-market.  
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could provide funds to support the development of CSR programmes.  
 We identify three main limitations of this study. First, our research focuses on the H&T 
industry, which limits the generalisability of the conclusions beyond that sector. Second, we 
cannot rule out that our evidence is sample-period specific, which limits the generalisability of 
the study’s results to a more recent period. Finally, previous research documents a positive 
association between institutional holdings and firms’ CSR performance (e.g. Smith, 1996; 
Duggal and Millar, 1999; Woidtke, 2002). Although we do our best to address reverse causality, 
it is possible that (1) our results capture this alternative explanation or (2) there is a simultaneous 
relation between CSR and institutional holdings (i.e. institutional investors buy shares in 
companies with higher CSR performance, which in turn prompts these firms to improve their 
CSR scores).  
Future research could examine the relation between CSR dimensions and institutional 
holdings at the industry level. The relative effects on the environment, communities, employees 
and other stakeholders differ between H&T industries (e.g. an airline has a greater environmental 
impact than a museum). Further, institutional investors may attach different CSR priorities to 
various industries (e.g. they may consider environmental impact to be more important for a 
transportation company and community impact as more relevant for a casino). Focusing on 
individual industries could uncover potential heterogeneity that is lost at the aggregate level. 
Future research could also examine whether our conclusions apply to other periods, including 
periods of market turbulence such as during the COVID-19 pandemic. We also recommend that 
future studies examine the channels through which CSR could attract institutional investors. For 
example, the structure of the corporate team responsible for implementing a CSR strategy can 
facilitate efficient communication with institutional investors, increasing the likelihood of these 
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Appendix A. NAICS codes for each of the four H&T sectors  
NAICS code Description 
1. Travel  
481111 Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation 
481211 Nonscheduled Chartered Passenger Air Transportation 
481212 Nonscheduled Chartered Freight Air Transportation 
481219 Other Nonscheduled Air Transportation 
483112 Deep Sea Passenger Transportation 
483114 Coastal and Great Lakes Passenger Transportation 
483212 Inland Water Passenger Transportation 
485999 All Other Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation 
487110 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation, Land 
487210 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation, Water 
487990 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation, Other 
488119 Other Airport Operations 
488999 All Other Support Activities for Transportation 
561510 Travel Agencies 
561520 Tour Operators 
561599 All Other Travel Arrangement and Reservation Services 
2. Hotels and recreation 
561591 Convention and Visitors Bureaus 
561990 All Other Support Services 
711190 Other Performing Arts Companies 
711212 Racetracks 
711219 Other Spectator Sports (Racing stables, horse) 
711310 Promoters of Performing Arts, Sports, and Similar Events with Facilities 
711320 Promoters of Performing Arts, Sports, and Similar Events without Facilities 
712110 Museum 
712130 Zoos and Botanical Gardens 
713110 Amusement and Theme Parks 
713120 Amusement Arcades 
713910 Golf Courses and Country Clubs 
713920 Skiing Facilities 
713930 Marinas 
713940 Fitness and Recreational Sports Centers 
713950 Bowling Centers 
713990 All Other Amusement and Recreation Industries 
721110 Hotels (except Casino Hotels) and Motels 
721120 Casino Hotels 
721191 Bed-and-Breakfast Inns 
721199 All Other Traveler Accommodation 
721211 RV (Recreational Vehicle) Parks and Campgrounds 
721214 Recreational and Vacation Camps (except Campgrounds) 
3. Casinos  
713210 Casinos (except Casino Hotels) 
713290 Other Gambling Industries 
 




722310 Food Service Contractors 
722320 Caterers 
722330 Mobile Food Services 
722511 Full-Service Restaurants 
722513 Limited-Service Restaurants 
722514 Cafeterias, Grill Buffets, and Buffets 
722515 Snack and Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars 
The table shows NAICS code for companies classified broadly into four groups: Travel, Hotels and recreation, Casinos 




Appendix B. Definitions of CSR measures 
Strengths Concerns 
Panel A. Net employee: sum of strengths-sum of concerns  
Union Relations Union Relations 
Cash Profit Sharing Employee Health & Safety 
Employee Involvement Supply Chain 
Employee Health and Safety Child Labor 
Supply Chain Labor Standards Labor-Management Relations  
Compensation & Benefits  
Employee Relations  
Professional Development  
Human Capital Management  
Labor Management (EMP-STR-M)  
Panel B. Net Diversity: sum of strengths-sum of concerns  
Board of Directors – Gender Workforce Diversity 
Women and Minority Contracting Board of Directors – Gender 
Employment of Underrepresented Groups Board of Directors - Minorities 
Other Strengths  
Panel C. Net Human Rights: sum of strengths-sum of concerns 
Humanity  
Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength Support for Controversial Regimes 
Human Rights Policies & Initiatives Freedom of Expression & Censorship 
 Human Rights Violations 
 Other Concerns 
Panel D. Net community: sum of strengths-sum of concerns  
Innovative Giving Community Impact 
Community Engagement  
Panel E. Net Environment: sum of strengths-sum of concerns 
Environmental Opportunities Regulatory Compliance 
Waste Management Toxic Spills & Releases 
Packaging Materials & Waste Climate Change 
Climate Change Impact of Products & Services 
Environmental Management Systems Biodiversity & Land Use 
Water Stress Operational Waste 
Biodiversity & Land Use Supply Chain Management 
Raw Material Sourcing Water Management 
Other Strengths  Other Concerns 
Panel F. Net CG: sum of strengths-sum of concerns  
Corruption & Political Instability Governance Structures 
Financial System Instability Controversial Investments 
 Business Ethics 
Panel G. Net Product and service: sum of strengths-sum of concerns 
Quality  Product Quality & Safety  
Social Opportunities  Marketing & Advertising  
Access to Finance  Anticompetitive Practices 
 Customer Relations 
  Other Concerns  
The table reports how we calculate the six CSR measures Net Employee, Net Diversity, Net Human Rights, Net 
Community, Net Environment, Net CG and Net Product and service.  
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Appendix C. Definitions of the dependent and control variables used in the study 
Abbreviation Definition 
Panel A. The dependent variables 
Institutional ownership Percentage institutional ownership measured as the sum of the holdings of all 
institutions in a firm’s stock divided by the stock’s total market capitalization at the 
end of each calendar quarter. 
Dedicated IO Dedicates institutional ownership (IO) defined as percentage holdings by dedicate 
investors measured as the sum of percentage holdings by dedicated institutions, 
which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms, and 
holdings by quasi-indexers, which trade infrequently. The measure is calculated at 
the end of each fiscal quarter.  
Domestic IO Domestic institutional ownership (IO) defined as percentage holdings by domestic 
institutional investors measured as the sum of the holdings of all institutions 
domiciled in the United States divided by the firm’s market capitalization. The 
measure is calculated at the end of each fiscal quarter. 
Top 5 IO Percentage holdings by top five blockholders. Blockholders are defined as investors 
who hold at least 5% of company’s stock. The measure is calculated at the end of 
each fiscal quarter. 
Panel B. The control variables 
MV Stock's market capitalization measured at the end of the fiscal quarter prior to the 
quarter where we measure institution holdings. 
B/M The book-to-market ratio measured as the ratio of book value of equity scaled by the 
firm's market capitalization.  
ROA Return on assets, measured as net income scaled by total assets.  
P/S Price to sales ratio measured as the market capitalization to total revenue.  
R&D Research and development expense scaled by total sales.  
Advertising Advertising expenses scaled by total sales.  
Leverage Financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt scaled by total assets.  




Appendix D. Average institutional ownership by H&T sector 
  Restaurants Casinos Hotels and 
recreation 
Travel 
Institutional ownership 0.843 0.634 0.745 0.877 
Dedicated IO 0.724 0.637 0.700 0.724 
Domestic IO 0.784 0.609 0.684 0.821 
Top 5 IO 0.340 0.264 0.312 0.342 





















Net Product and 
service 
  
 Est Est Est Est Est Est Est 
Intercept 0.126  -0.291 *** 0.058 *** 0.026  0.177 *** 0.079 * 0.017  
Past IO 0.199  0.124  -0.017  -0.016  -0.064  0.071  0.023  
Past Net Employee 0.358 *** 0.007  -0.001  0.000  0.030  -0.004  -0.099 *** 
Past Net Diversity 0.072 * 0.472 *** 0.019 *** 0.015  0.027  0.059 *** 0.001  
Past Net Human Rights 0.555 ** 0.413 *** 0.343 *** 0.024  0.310 *** 0.020  0.067  
Past Net Community 0.643 *** 0.100  0.041 * 0.567 *** 0.352 *** 0.029  0.264 *** 
Past Net Environment 0.150 *** 0.049 ** 0.010 * 0.042 *** 0.573 *** 0.043 *** 0.015  
Past Net CG -0.194 ** -0.118 *** 0.006  -0.048 *** -0.011  0.516 *** -0.157 ** 
Past Net Product and 
service 
-0.011  -0.007  0.005  -0.044 *** -0.085 *** -0.105 *** 0.255 *** 
Controls included Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 1294  1294  1294  1294  1294  1294  1294  
Model p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0  
Adjusted R2 28.51% 30.51% 1.49% 31.75% 53.77% 38.43%  23.34%  
The table reports results from regressing the CSR dimensions on institutional ownership and CSR dimensions. measured in the previous year. * denotes significance 







Table 1  
Sample distribution over time and by sector 
              
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Restaurants 76 101 113 126 118 130 129 108 89 990 
Casinos 11 16 15 12 12 12 13 11 12 114 
Hotels and recreation 49 67 64 56 57 58 58 69 66 544 
Travel 31 45 45 48 51 52 49 47 48 416 
Total 167 229 237 242 238 252 249 235 215 2064 





The relative rankings of industries on each CSR dimension 











Net Human Rights 
Hotels and 
recreation 
Travel Restaurants Casinos 





























Descriptive statistics for regression variables         
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Panel A. The dependent variables     
Institutional ownership 0.812 0.184 0.268 1.000 
Dedicated IO 0.713 0.111 0.424 0.941 
Domestic IO 0.755 0.185 0.000 0.996 
Top 5 IO 0.329 0.114 0.090 0.843 
Panel B. The CSR measures     
Net Employee 0.234 0.786 -1.000 3.000 
Net Diversity -0.056 0.671 -1.000 2.000 
Net Human Rights 0.023 0.151 0.000 1.000 
Net Community 0.061 0.239 0.000 1.000 
Net Environment 0.256 0.676 -1.000 3.000 
Net CG -0.041 0.274 -1.000 1.000 
Net Product and service -0.109 0.521 -2.000 1.000 
Panel C. The control variables      
MV 7431.6 15259.5 100.5 91126.0 
B/M 0.492 0.516 0.006 2.883 
ROA 0.159 0.081 -0.008 0.365 
P/S 1.690 1.733 0.158 12.868 
R&D 0.076 0.398 0.000 2.733 
Advertising 0.022 0.034 0.000 0.231 
















(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3, continued 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, Panel B for the CSR measures and Panel C for controls. Panel D reports Pearson correlations 










Panel D. Pearson correlations between the CSR measures 
  Net Employee Net Diversity Net Human Rights Net Community Net Environment Net CG 
Net Diversity 0.073***      
Net Human Rights 0.032 0.243***     
Net Community 0.103*** 0.354*** 0.379***    
Net Environment 0.092*** 0.339*** 0.241*** 0.427***   
Net CG -0.084*** -0.007 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.093***  




Regression results: the relation between CSR and institutional ownership  





Intercept 0.764 ***   0.000     
Net Employee 0.025 *** 10.8% 1.083 0.007 ** 
Net Diversity 0.061 *** 22.3% 1.291 0.017 *** 
Net Human Rights -0.088 *** -7.2% 1.231 0.062 *** 
Net Community -0.060 *** -7.7% 1.631 0.009  
Net Environment 0.005  1.8% 1.635 0.003  
Net CG 0.080 *** 11.9% 1.154 0.032 *** 
Net Product and service 0.017 ** 4.8% 1.230 -0.007  
ln MV 0.009 ** 8% 2.441 0.053 *** 
B/M -0.053 *** -15% 1.723 -0.029 *** 
ROA 0.035  2% 1.590 -0.131 ** 
P/S 0.007 *** 7% 1.532 -0.009 *** 
Leverage 0.031  4% 1.373 -0.093 *** 
R&D -5.734  -1% 1.156 14.290  
Advertising -0.444 *** -8% 1.090 0.690 ** 
Controls included Yes    Yes  
N 2064    2064  
Model p-value 0.000    0.000  
Adjusted R2 16.70%       87.62%   
The table reports regression results for equation (1). Column STD estimates shows coefficients for variables 
standardized to a mean of zero and unit standard deviation. VIF is the variance inflation factors. * denotes significance 





Dedicated ownership, domestic institutional investors and blockholdings 
 Dedicated IO Domestic IO Top 5 IO 
  Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Intercept 0.684 *** 0.716 *** 0.331 *** 
Net Employee 0.012 *** 0.020 *** 0.007 *** 
Net Diversity 0.052 *** 0.054 *** 0.019 *** 
Net Human Rights -0.059 ** -0.063 ** -0.044 *** 
Net Community -0.059 *** -0.061 *** -0.054 *** 
Net Environment 0.008  -0.008  0.003  
Net CG 0.091 *** 0.072 *** 0.030 *** 
Net Product and service 0.011  0.019 ** 0.025 *** 
Controls included Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 2064  2064  2064  
Model p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Adjusted R2 29.27%   16.31%   20.25%   
The table reports regression results where we use as the dependent variable the percentage ownership by dedicated 
institutional investors, Dedicated IO, percentage ownership by domestic institutional investors, Domestic IO, and 
ownership by top 5 institutional investors, Top 5 IO. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance 





Sensitivity tests for the relation between CSR and institutional ownership 
 IO (recalculated KLD) IO (org KLD measures) Instrumental variables 
  Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Intercept 0.627 *** 0.702 *** 0.766 *** 
Net Employee 0.028 *** 0.018 *** 0.030 *** 
Net Diversity 0.040 *** 0.037 *** 0.069 *** 
Net Human Rights -0.037  -0.175 *** -0.110 *** 
Net Community -0.045 *** 0.000  -0.076 *** 
Net Environment 0.002  0.000  0.004  
Net CG 0.108 *** 0.066 *** 0.094 *** 
Net Product and service 0.022 * 0.003  0.024 *** 
Controls included Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 2064  1138  2064  
Model p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Adjusted R2 13.85%   27.05%       
The table reports regression results for sensitivity tests. Column ‘IO (recalculated KLD)’ reports results when we 
recalculate each CSR measure as ratios of (1 + strengths)/(1 + strengths + concerns). Column ‘IO (org KLD measures)’ 
reports equation (1) results with the original KLD measures that were discounting in 2013. Column ‘Instrumental 
variables’ reports results from 2SLS regressions. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 
